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NOTES
objective of the statute, as it eliminates any doubt which the
Motor Sales Co. case may have created concerning the act's
application to secondary debtors. The sole remaining doubt is
provided by the unfortunate dictum in the Lofton case. It is
to be hoped that the Louisiana courts will seize upon the first
opportunity to repudiate this dictum, and to reaffirm the rationale
of the Walmsley and Simmons cases.
Ronald Lee Davis, Jr.
LOUISIANA PRACTICE-EXECUTORY PROCESS-USE OF INJUNCTION
TO RAISE QUESTION OF AUTHENTICITY
Plaintiff invoked the seizure of defendant's automobile
under executory process' to enforce a chattel mortgage given
to secure the unpaid portion of the purchase price. This mort-
gage was evidenced by an act under private signature duly
acknowledged and was identified with a promissory note exe-
cuted in connection therewith. Defendant sought injunction
to oppose plaintiff's use of executory process, upon the ground
that the mortgage was not in authentic form. The trial court
held that defendant's remedy was by appeal from the order
of seizure and sale. Held, the issue of lack of authentic evidence
may be raised by a defendant in executory proceedings by
resort to injunctive process. General Motors Acceptance Corp.
v. Anzelmo, 222 La. 1019, 64 So. 2d 417 (1953).
Though generally service of citation cannot be waived, nor
judgment confessed, Louisiana's Constitution makes a specific
exception in the case of executory process. 2 Historically, the
procedure recognized by this constitutional provision was de-
veloped originally by the medieval Italian jurists out of the
1. For the information of the common law lawyer, it may be pointed
out that a proceeding is executory when seizure of the debtor's property
is obtained without previous citation, by virtue of an act or title importing
confession of judgment. Art. 98, La. Code of Practice of 1870, provides for
executory process in other cases also. This idea is foreign to the common
law, for a confession of judgment prior to maturity of an obligation is an
absolute nullity under that system. See Tidd, Practice 599 et seq. (9 ed.
1840). It may be further pointed out that the common law cognovit actionem
Is roughly analogous to the procedure used in the principal case. In the
cognovit actionem situation confession of judgment does not take place until
after maturity of the obligation; whereas confession of judgment warrant-
ing executory process is confected prior to maturity. It is the idea of con-
fession of judgment prior to maturity which the common law rejects.
2. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 44.
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blending of the Lombard notion of the private seizure of a
debtor's goods with the Roman maxim "confessus in jure pro
judicato habetur."' The analogy of the confession of judgment
originally led to the requirement of the execution of the pledge
or mortgage, and of the confession of judgment, before a judge,
so that all that remained was to obtain execution if the debt was
not paid at maturity. Eventually, execution of the instrument
containing the confession of judgment was permitted before the
notary, who traditionally possessed quasi judicial powers under
the civil law.
Initially, the execution of the mortgage or privilege through
seizure and sale of the hypothecated property was ex parte,
and the debtor was afforded no opportunity to present a defense.
In the development of executory procedure, however, the anal-
ogy of the judicial confession of judgment again provided a solu-
tion to this problem. Since, under Roman law, the judgment
debtor could always enjoin the execution of the alleged con-
fession of judgment on the ground of fraud, payment, prescrip-
tion, et cetera, eventually the judgment debtor was permitted
to raise these defenses to the executory procedure in a separate
injunction suit.4 This injunction suit provided the debtor his
day in court, in effect constituted the only answer which he
could make, and was the only way in which in executory pro-
cess our notions of fair play involved in the concept of due pro-
cess could be effectuated. Louisiana inherited executory process
from Spanish law, and in the redaction of the Code of Practice
of 1825, Spanish procedural rules formed the basis of the appli-
cable code provisions.
The Code of Practice authorizes the use of executory pro-
cess in two cases: (1) enforcement of a privilege or mortgage
evidenced by an executory title; and (2) enforcement of a judg-
ment of another Louisiana court.6
3. Engelmann-Millar, History of Continental Civil Procedure 9 (1927).
4. Id. at 498-501. Pertinent excerpts of the foregoing are set forth in
2 McMahon, Louisiana Practice 1421 (1939).
5. See 2 Louisiana Legal Archives 115-119 (1937), where the redactors'
notes indicate Febrero's adicionado as the source of the basic articles. This
reference is to Febrero, Libreria de escribanos (ed. 1817).
6. Art. 732, La. Code of Practice of 1870. In this connection see also
Arts. 746, 752, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
It would appear that the theory of permitting the use of executory
process to enforce judgments of other Louisiana courts is based on the
recognition of the dignity to be accorded judgments contradictorily ob-
tained. That a judgment thus acquired is entitled to greater weight than
the quasi-judicial authentic act cannot be denied. It is to be noted that the
[VOL. XiV
1953] NOTES 291
In Louisiana, originally an act was said to import a con-
fession of judgment in matters of privilege and mortgage when
such act was passed before a notary public and two witnesses
and wherein the debtor acknowledged the obligation to which
the privilege or mortgage relates.7 This requirement, insofar
as movables are concerned, was relaxed in 1952 to permit the
enforcement via executiva of a chattel mortgage executed under
private signature, if "duly acknowledged. '8
use of executory process to enforce judgments of other Louisiana courts
is rather limited. The court rendering the judgment can simply issue a
writ of fleri facias directed to the sheriff of the parish where the property
to be seized is situated. See Arts. 641-642, La. Code of Practice of 1870. See
also Lafon v. Smith, 3 La. 473 (1832) for a very early application of Article
642. This point is discussed at length by the opinion in Marine Bank &
Trust Co. v. Shaffer, 166 La. 164, 116 So. 838 (1928). Resort to executory
process is still necessary in two cases: (1) garnishment under the writ of
fieri facias where the garnishee has his domicile in another parish (see
Arts. 642[2], 246[3, 4], La. Code of Practice of 1870; Featherston'h v. Comp-
ton, 3 La. Ann. 380 [1848]; E. Marqueze & Co. v. LeBlanc, 29 La. Ann. 194
[1877]), and (2) examination of a judgment debtor domiciled in another
parish (see La. R.S. 1950, 13:4311, 4312[4]). ,
Originally executory process was available to enforce judgments ren-
dered by other states and even foreign countries. Apparently its use in this
connection proved unsatisfactory, so that prior to 1870 the article was
amended.
7. Art. 733, La. Code of Practice of 1870. Art. 2234, La. Civil Code of
1870, reads in part: "The authentic act, as relates to contracts, is that
which has been executed before a notary public or other officer authorized
to execute such functions, in presence of two witnesses, aged at least four-
teen years, or of three witnesses, if a party be blind. If a party does not
know how to sign, the notary must cause him to affix his mark to the
instrument."
See La. R.S. 1950, 35:7, which provides that acts executed before any
commissioned officer of the United States armed forces shall have the same
force and effect as if made or executed before a notary in Louisiana. To
the same effect as regards ambassadors and consular officials, see La. R.S.
1950, 35:9. The Governor may appoint commissioners for each one of the states
and territories of the union, who shall have the powers of a notary public.
In this connection see La. R.S. 1950, 35:454-457. Cf. La. R.S. 1950, 35:460.
8. La. R.S. Supp. 1952, 9:5363, provides: "All laws and rules and all
remedies and processes now or hereafter made available to creditors for
the protection or enforcement of their rights under mortgages affecting
immovables shall be available to creditors of obligations secured by mort-
gages affecting movables. The right of executory process is hereby specifi-
cally granted to all creditors on movable property as hereinabove set forth
whether their rights shall arise under the terms of [an] authentic act or
acts under private signature duly acknowledged." (Italics supplied.)
This amendment legislatively overrules Osborne v. Mossler Acceptance
Co., 214 La. 503, 38 So. 2d 151 (1948), and the opinion expressed in Miller,
The Louisiana Chattel Mortgage and Small Loans Act, 23 Tulane L. Rev.
61, 70-73 (1948).
The Chattel Mortgage Act, La. RS. Supp. 1952, 9:5363, simply provides
that a mortgage under private act "duly acknowledged" can be enforced
by executory process. Acknowledgment in this sense merely means that
the person against whom the act under private signature is adduced appears
before a notary and affirms that he executed such act as his free act and
deed. See Arts. 2242, 2260, and 2261, La. Civil Code of 1870. Cf. La. R.S.
1950, 35:511-513, 35:551-555, and 13:3720.
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A proceeding by which a person's property is summarily
seized and sold without citation is one of great severity; and
it appears axiomatic that "to justify the order of seizure and
sale every muniment of title, and every link of evidence must
be in authentic form."9 There appears to be no dissent from the
foregoing requirement. The difficulty has arisen as to the remedy
a defendant must use to raise the issue of authenticity.
The instant case considers the conflicting cases and in the
view of the writer clearly dispels the arguments espoused for
the disallowal of injunction to raise the issue of lack of authentic
evidence.
Prior to the passage of the present injunction statute,0 the
strongest argument, it would seem, against permitting the use
of injunction to raise the question of authenticity in executory
proceedings was bottomed on the premise that such remedy,
usually an ex parte order, would in effect defeat the whole
idea behind proceedings via executiva-that is, a fast and effi-
cient means of enforcing an undisputed mortgage or privilege
on property. This reason no longer exists for no writ of injunc-
tion may now be issued without notice,1 ' except, of course, in
those cases where the court, upon a proper showing, may in
its discretion issue a temporary restraining order.12 Further, as
the instant opinion indicates, a devolutive appeal would not be
an adequate remedy; 13 and, if resort must be had to suspensive
appeal, in many cases the defendant would be deprived of his
remedy to protect his property from illegal seizure and sale
because of the requirement of a bond in the amount of one and
one-half times the mortgage indebtedness.14  It was further
pointed out that a defendant desirous of raising the issue of
9. Miller, Lyon & Co. v. Cappel, 36 La. Ann. 264 (1884). Cf. Miller v.
Gaskins, 3 Rob. 94 (La. 1842); Lowry v. Erwin, 6 Rob. 192 (La. 1843);
Dunlap v. Hundly, 2 La. Ann. 212 (1847); Chambliss v. Atchison, 2 La.
Ann. 488 (1847); Fortier v. Burthe, 19 La. Ann. 510 (1867); Bank of Lees-
ville v. Wingate, 123 La. 386, 48 So. 1005 (1909); Hackemuller v. Figueroa,
125 La. 307, 51 So. 207 (1910).
10. La. Act 29 of 1924, now La. R.S. 1950, 13:4062 et seq.
11. La. R.S. 1950, 13:4062.
12. La. R.S. 1950, 13:4064.
13. The reason for the ineffectiveness of a devolutive appeal lies in
the fact that pending the appeal the property will be sold, so that the
appeal has to be dismissed as presenting only a moot question. Jurispru-
dential authority for this proposition will be found in Citizens' Bank of
Columbia v. Bellamy Lumber Co., 140 La. 497, 73 So. 308 (1916); Ouachita
National Bank v. Shell Beach Const. Co., 154 La. 709, 98 So. 160 (1923); T.
Hofman-Olsen, Inc. v. Northern Lumber Co., 160 La. 839, 107 So. 593 (1926).
14. See Arts. 145.7, 575, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
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authenticity and other questions would be compelled to resort
to an appeal for one and to an injunction for the other-result-
ing in multiplicity, which the law abhors.
Professor McMahon in his work on Louisiana Practice"b
has pointed out the conflict of authority on the instant point.
Two of the reasons which he advances for permitting the de-
fendant to raise the question of authenticity by injunction16
were invoked by the court in the instant case and need not be
discussed further. A third reason which he advances, and which
was not adverted to in the instant case, appears to the writer
to be one of the strongest arguments available to support the
court's position here; and that is that a defendant in executory
process should not only be permitted, but should be required,
to seek the necessary relief from the trial court which com-
mitted the error before invoking the aid of the appellate court. 7
Usually a plaintiff proceeding via executiva will present his
petition for the order of seizure and sale to the judge along
with the supporting authentic act. The court does not have
time, nor should it be expected, to read each paper placed
before it and hence signs the order, depending on the implied
assurance of plaintiff's counsel that everything is in authentic
form. If it later develops that there is a lack of authentic evi-
dence to support the order, it would appear that the trial judge
would welcome the opportunity to correct his error rather than
have his knuckles rapped by an appellate court.
Perhaps even more important than any -of the foregoing
is the fact that in certain cases a remedy by appeal is totally
inadequate. 18
15. 2 McMahon, Louisiana Practice 1464, n. 17 (1939). The same author
further points up wherein Chief Justice O'Niell's opinion in the case of
Weber v. Dawson, 172 La. 213, 133 So. 751 (1931), cites the exact authorities
upon which the learned jurist relied in his dissenting opinion in the case
of Jones v. Bouanchaud, 158 La. 27, 103 So. 393 (1925). Nor did the Chief
Justice in the Dawson case cite any authority to the contrary of the posi-
tion taken by the court, though at the time ample contrary authority had
been reported in prior opinions. Along this line see the Bouanchaud case
cited supra.
16. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1937-1938
Term, 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 314, 322, n. 14 (1939). See also note 15 supra.
17. Cf. Ascension Red Cypress Co. v. New River Drainage District, 169
La. 606, 125 So. 730 (1930).
18. Suppose that, in the enforcement via executiva of a real mortgage,
the mortgagor contended that he had not signed the mortgage and note
in the presence of a notary and two witnesses and that hence, despite
its appearance, in truth and in fact it is not authentic. Suppose in the
case of a chattel mortgage the mortgagor contends that he never "duly
acknowledged" his execution of the mortgage and mortgage notes before
1953]
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Though the early cases1" are specific in holding that Article
73920 enumerates the only grounds upon which executory pro-
cess can be enjoined, the later cases2 1 are just as specific in hold-
ing that Article 739 merely illustrates the grounds upon which
an injunction may be secured without bond and that this article
does not exclude the issuance of an injunction with bond on
other grounds. The instant case finally settles the point that
lack of authentic evidence is one of these "other grounds."
It is heartening to note that though the question of authen-
ticity may have been presented on appeal only obliquely,2 2 the
court was nevertheless justified in definitively settling this issue.
Inasmuch as the 1952 act permitting a chattel mortgage
under private signature duly acknowledged 23 to be enforced
by executory process was passed after he had confessed judg-
ment, the defendant urged that to allow plaintiff the use of
executory process would be in violation of Article VII, Section
44, of the Louisiana Constitution. The basis for such contention
was founded upon the premise that Act 441 of 1952 was sub-
stantive or created a new right in plaintiff and hence could not
be given retroactive effect. The court sufficiently and correctly
dealt with this problem, holding that the act was remedial and
the notary or anybody else. The remedy by appeal in these cases is value-
less, as proof of the mortgagor's contentions do not appear in the record
and if the debtor could not raise his contentions through injunction he
would have his property seized and sold summarily without any basis
therefor in Louisiana law.
19. Exchange & Banking Co. v. Walden, 15 La. 431 (1840); Dupre v.
Anderson, 45 La. Ann. 1134, 13 So. 743 (1893).
20. Art. 739, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
21. Sowell v. Cox, 10 Rob. 68 (La. 1845); Hackemuller v. Figueroa, 125
La. 307, 51 So. 207 (1916); Jones v. Bouanchaud, 158 La. 27, 103 So. 393 (1925).
22. The observation here made is based upon the following language from
the instant opinion: "The relator (defendant below) makes no contention
that the ruling of the trial judge on the latter point [that is, that his
remedy to raise the question of authenticity was by appeal from the order
of seizure and sale] is not supported by jurisprudence of this Court, but
claims that petition for injunctive relief was the only means available to
him to attack the constitutionality of Act No. 441 of 1952 in so far as it is
deemed to be applicable to his mortgage, confected four months prior to
the effective date of the Act." 222 La. 1019, 1021, 64 So. 2d 417, 418 (1953).
This observation is further bolstered by the fact that the brief filed in
behalf of relator does not disclose that the specific question of authenticity
was raised by him though a reading of the original brief filed in behalf
of the respondent discloses that counsel for the latter party submitted this
question as his main argument. See Brief for Relator, pp. 2-3 and Brief
for Respondent, pp. 4-6, General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Anzelmo, 222
La. 1019, 64 So. 2d 417 (1953).
23. La. R.S. Supp. 1952, 9:5363, as amended by La. Act 441 of 1952.
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hence retroactive. 24 The 1952 act merely provides that in the
case of movable property executory process may be resorted
to in those cases where the confession of judgment and chat-
tel mortgag.e are by private act duly acknowledged. Prior to
the passage of this act executory process could be resorted to
only in those cases where the act importing confession of judg-
ment was in authentic 'form.25 It is to be noted that the 1952
act did not change the rule as applied to immovable property.
The court cogently. pointed out that "the fact that the proce-
dural remedy [defendant] Contracted for was in a form which
at that time would not have authorized executory process does
not detract from the vaiidity of his confession of judgrnent.2 6
(Italics supplied.)
Executory process is one of the simplest, most expeditious,
and effective remedies available in Louisiana. Under the regime
of Coreil v. Vidrine,21 it had one serious defect in not affording
the debtor a day in court or an adequate opportunity to assert
his defenses. The principal case completely removes these ob-




Three grandchildren of the deceased Mrs. William Gomez,
children of a predeceased son, sued the only surviving child,
Mrs. Amelie Gomez Salatich, and the testamentary executrix,
for the collation of certain sums given the daughter during the
lifetime of Mrs. Gomez.' The deceased gave her daughter $19,200
in the form of checks 2 in monthly installments between 1930 and
24. See discussion of this point in Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber Co.,
Inc. v. Wilson, 195 La. 814, 197 So. 566 (1940).
25. Osborne v. Mossier Acceptance Co., 214 La. 503, 38 So. 2d 151 (1948).
Cf. La. Act 172 of 1944.
26. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Anzelmo, 222 La. 1019, 64 So. 2d
417, 420 (1953).
27. 188 La. 343, 177 So. 233 (1937).
1. This case is one for collation only and not for reduction of an exces-
sive donation, because it is conceded that the total amount received by
Mrs. Salatich does not exceed the disposable portion of her mother's estate.
2. The question that a check, if considered an incorporeal thing, could
not be the object of a manual gift was not raised in the instant case. See
Art. 1539, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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